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STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC.
and DOES 1 through 10 inclusively,
Respondents.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE MAGISTRATE COURT OF THE SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY
COMES NOW, Appellant, Amey J. Nelson, by and through her counsel ofrecord, Allen
H. Browning, ISB #3007, and appeals the Order of Summary Judgment of the District Court
entered March 6, 2018.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction lies in this Court for appeal from the decision of a district judge pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 11.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court erred in finding that Defendant was not an independent contractor.

This portion of Appellant's Brief will discuss how the district court erred in making a finding
that the defendant was not an independent contractor due to the Defendants' lack of a
showing of evidence to contest Plaintiffs claim that she was an independent contractor. This
section will also begin to discuss, factually, who has the power to determine if Defendant
was an independent contractor or agent.
Apparent authority does not protect Defendant.

This portion of the Brief will discuss what apparent authority is and why it does not apply to
this case or to Defendant.
The Court erred by making a finding that and agency relationship existed when it had no
power to do so.

This portion of Appellant's Brief discusses the district court's error as a matter of law in
making findings which it had no power or authority to make.
The Court erred by construing facts in a light most favorable to the moving party.

This portion of Appellant's Brief discusses the district court's errors in viewing the facts
before it in light of the moving party when the moving party presented no facts.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On one occasion Plaintiff was using the Anytime Fitness facilities by herself and saw
a notice on a whiteboard posted by the office at that location, which advertised a
"circuit class" at Anytime Fitness and that a trainer would be teaching the class. (R.,
p. Aug 1, L. 4-6).
2. The circuit class was put on by Anytime Fitness and it was clear that an instructor
would be selected by Anytime Fitness. (R., p. Aug 12 L. 1-4).
3. Plaintiff did not arrange for Stefani Kaufman to instruct the class. (R., p. Aug 2, L. 7-

9).
4. The Principal here, Anytime Fitness, has stated that Defendant was never an agent or
employee of Anytime Fitness or AT Fitness, LLC. (R., p. 63-64, L. 4, 1-3).
5. The principal here, Anytime Fitness has stated in an affidavit that Defendant was an
independent contractor to Anytime Fitness. (R., p. 64, L. 6-7).
6. The principal here, Anytime Fitness has stated in an affidavit that Defendant was paid
as an independent contractor, for one task, by Anytime Fitness. (R., p. 64, L. 6-7).
7. Plaintiff attended the class at the date and time noted on the whiteboard. (R., p. Aug
2, L. 10-11).
8. Plaintiff was the only attendee of the class. (R., p. Aug 2, L. 17).
9. Defendant was the only other person present for the class. (R., p. Aug 2, L. 21).
10. Plaintiff followed Defendant's instructions exactly as she was told. (R., p. Aug 2, L.
22).
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11. Defendant directed Plaintiff to the machine. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 7-9) ..
12. Defendant directed Plaintiff as to how to hold the handles of the machine. (R., p. Aug
3, L. 2-3).
13. Defendant, having observed that Plaintiff was not able to use the machine properly,
changed the configuration of the handles on the machine. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 4-5).
14. Defendant instructed Plaintiff to push down on the machine with the end of the
handle in the palm of her hand instead of pushing down with the wide part of the
handle. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 4-5).
15. Defendant was in front of Plaintiff directing her movements the entire time she was
on the machine. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 6-7).
16. The handles of the machine rotated when pushed, they were not fixed in place. (R., p.
Aug 3, L. 8).
17. Defendant instructed Plaintiff how to hold the handles on the machine she was
instructed to use. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 9-10).
18. Defendant improperly instructed Plaintiff how to hold the handles on the machine.
(R., p. Aug 9, L. 8, p. Aug 9, L. 1-6.)
19. Defendant instructed Plaintiff to push down on the handles, causing her left hand to
move sideways, flipping the machine handle over and subsequently striking her left
hand. (R., p. Aug 3, L. 11-14).
20. The strike caused a fracture in the metatarsal bone of Plaintiff's left hand. (R., p. Aug
3, L. 11-14).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

6

INTRODUCTION

This appeal stems from a Personal Injury Case filed in the Seventh Judicial District of
Idaho, County of Bonneville. Plaintiff, Amey J. Nelson, alleged that she sustained a fracture to
her 5th metacarpal bone while following the instruction of Defendant, Stefani Kaufman.
Plaintiff initially sued both Stefani Kaufman an Anytime Fitness. Anytime Fitness
defended on the basis of an agreement it had with Amey J. Nelson and submitted an affidavit that
it was not liable for the actions of Stefani Kaufman because she was not an agent and that she
was an independent contractor. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Anytime Fitness. This Appeal is not from that judgment.
Defendant Stefani Kaufman then moved for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted erroneously as a matter oflaw.
Plaintiff filed this Appeal in response to the erroneous judgment by the District Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same standard of review the
district court originally applied in its ruling. Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23, 333 P.3d 130,
134 (2014) (citing Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 804, 291 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012)).
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure. 56(a). "When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all
reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

7

Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., 159 Idaho 679, 685, 365 P.3d 1033, 1039 (2016).

The moving party has the burden of establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 317, 246 P .3d 961, 970 (2010). "If

the moving party has demonstrated the absence of a question of material fact, the burden shifts to
the nonrnoving party to demonstrate an issue of material fact that will preclude summary
judgment." Id. (citations omitted). The nonrnoving party must present evidence contradicting that
submitted by the movant, and which demonstrates a question of material fact. Kiebert v. Goss, 144
Idaho 225,228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007). However, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight
doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of
summary judgment." Wright v. Ada Cnty., 160 Idaho 491, 495, 376 P.3d 58, 62 (2016) (citing
Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 695, 698 (2007)). "Both constitutional questions

and questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law over which this Court exercises free
review." Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40,232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010).

ARGUMENT
I. The Court Erred in finding that Defendant was not an Independent Contractor.
An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent employment,
contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods without being subject to the
control of his employer except as to the result of his work. Goble v. Boise-Payette Lumber Co.,
38 Idaho 525,527 (1924); also Idaho Code§ 72-102(16).
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that, when there is an issue of status, it is the principal
who determines whether a worker is an independent contractor or has any other relationship with
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the company. In Chamberlain v. The Amalgamated Sugar Company, the Court stated that, "A
person dealing with an agent should ascertain the extent of his authority from the principal and he
cannot rely upon the agent's statement or assumption of authority, or upon the mere presumption

Chamberlain v. The Amalgamted Sugar Company, 42 Idaho 604, 612

of authority."

( 1926)(emphasis added).
In this case the owner of the company clearly stated in a sworn affidavit that Defendant
was an independent contractor and was never an agent or employee of Anytime Fitness. Aug. Pg.
7, L. 1-3; 14-15. There is no other interpretation that can be made considering the evidence in the
case, even if all facts were erroneously construed in favor of the moving party. Here, the Court
erroneously made the finding that Defendant was an Agent of Anytime Fitness based upon a theory
of apparent authority. Tr. P. 78, L. 20-21.
The Idaho Supreme Court has developed a four part test to determine whether a worker is
an employee/agent or an independent contractor. The four parts of this test, found in Shriner v.

Rausch, are: 1) the employer's control of the worker; 2) the method in which the worker was
paid; 3) whether major items of equipment were furnished by employer or worker; 4) and
whether either party has the right to terminate the relationship at will. Shriner v. Rausch, 141
Idaho 228, 231 (2005).

A. Shriner Factors
1.

Employer's Control of Worker

Kaufman was approached by Anytime Fitness to teach a circuit training class (R., p. 6364, L. 4, 1-3 ). Kaufman at no time has alleged or indicated that she was employed by Anytime
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Fitness either in a full or part-time capacity. It is clear from the record that Kaufman was given
ample authority to teach the class how she chose to teach it and at no time did Anytime Fitness
exercise any control over Kaufman or her methods, only indicating the results they were
interested in. Anytime Fitness's lack of any type of control over how Kaufman performed the
singular task she was hired for clearly demonstrates that the nature of Kaufman's employment
was that of an independent contractor and not that of an employee/agent.

2. The Method of Payment.
The terms of payment by Anytime Fitness to Kaufman have not been disclosed at this
time; however, Defendant bears the burden as the moving party for Summary Judgment to
supply specific facts to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of any material fact in the case.
Where there is ambiguity, the evidence is to be liberally construed in favor of the nonrnoving
party. Without Anytime Fitness providing a clear history ofW-2 forms indicating Kaufman's
payments as well as indicating that she was in fact an employee on tax forms, her form of
payment cannot be construed in any way other than that of an independent contractor.

3. Furnishing of Major Items of Equipment.
There is no dispute that Anytime Fitness furnished the facility and exercise equipment;
however, Kaufman's duties did not extend to the requirement that any equipment be provided to
her. She was contracted to instruct a circuit training class and instruct patrons of Anytime
Fitness how to use the equipment in a manner consistent with circuit training while adhering to
her duty of care as a fitness instructor to promote, represent, and practice safety, support, and
exercise methodology to enhance the life of their client.
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Here, although equipment was furnished to Kaufman by Anytime Fitness, it was not
required or necessary for the completion of the task Kaufman was contracted for, and as such,
should not be considered in this case to weigh in favor of either an employer- employee
relationship or an independent contractor relationship.

4. Whether either party could terminate the relationship at will.
Defendant has made no showing that would be any repercussions for either party to
terminate their relationship at any time, without cause. Because cause of action would arise from
the termination by either party, it is clear that no employer-employee/agent relationship existed
between Anytime Fitness and Kaufman. Therefore, the relationship appears to be one of a
principal and an independent contractor.
The factors outlined in Shriner are a balancing test, which in this case, clearly favors the
interpretation that the relationship between Anytime Fitness and Kaufman was that of an
independent contractor relationship. Defendant, at the summary judgment stage, had the burden
of showing that no question of material fact existed for which a trier of fact could rule in favor of
Plaintiff. Defendant did not show, through testimony, deposition, affidavit, or other evidence
admissible at trial that the case could not be ruled in Plaintiffs favor. Therefore, Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment should not have been granted.
Agency, actual or apparent, is created by Anytime Fitness, not by Stefani Kaufman's or
Amey J. Nelson's statement of belief. Evidence of apparent authority is irrelevant. The question
is: was Defendant an actual agent of Anytime Fitness or was Defendant an independent contractor?
Defendant has not denied that she has a contract with Anytime Fitness. Plaintiff believes she has
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not produced the contract because the contract would spell out that she is an independent contractor
and not an agent of Anytime Fitness.
Plaintiffs have shown that Kaufman was not considered an agent, in any capacity, by
Anytime Fitness.
Kaufman produced neither her contract from Anytime Fitness nor an affidavit from anyone
from Anytime Fitness stating what her status with that company was. Defendant Kaufman has
failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate that she was an agent of Anytime Fitness aside from
mere speculation and inference drawn from her contracted ability to teach a single class.
Defendant Kaufman admits on page three (3) of her Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs
Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider that "Whether facts sufficient to constitute an agency
relationship exist is a question of fact for the jury." (R., p. 122, L. 1-6.)
Defendant Kaufman then fallaciously argued that the burden shifted to the Plaintiff to prove
that Kaufman was an independent contractor. Plaintiff must show facts contrary to Defendant's
assertions in order to survive summary judgment, but there is no shifting of evidential burden. The
burden remains consistently on the Defendant to prove her defense. The Defendant has provided
no showing of facts or evidence which could lead to the conclusion that Defendant Kaufman had
any legal authority to act for, contract for, order inventory for, or otherwise perform any of the
duties given to a legal agent. Defendant has further attempted to claim that a failed argument by
Plaintiffs against AT Fitness, LLC., attempting to prove that AT Fitness was liable for the actions
of Defendant Kaufman, but that could not be established and is not controlling.
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In order for Defendant to be an agent of Anytime Fitness she would need to demonstrate
that the principal, Anytime Fitness and AT Fitness, LLC., by Anytime Fitness or AT Fitness
LLC., recognized her as an agent. Agency cannot be proven by mere self-declaration.
Defendant asserted that she was independently contracted to teach a single class at Anytime
Fitness and that this single instance was sufficient to create an agency relationship between
herself and Anytime Fitness. Tr. P. 17, L. 7-8.

II. Apparent Authority does not protect Defendant.
"Agency" is not a concept in the abstract. As the Restatement of Agency states:
"Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a "principal")
manifests assent to another person (an "agent") that the agent shall act on the principal's
behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise
consents so to act."
Restatement of the Law, Third: Agency Section 1.01.
Agency is a fiduciary relationship to people with whom the principal acts; his fiduciary
responsibility to third parties exists when an agent acts on his behalf. This was stated quite clearly
and accurately in Plaintiffs original brief on this matter.
Apparent authority is not a defense to that apparent agent; it is a means for an injured party
to hold a principal liable for the actions of the apparent agent.

Apparent authority is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a
principal's legal relations wit/, third parties when a third party reasonably
believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief
is traceable to the principal's manifestations.
Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 2.03 (2006).
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As shown in the Restatement of Agency, the purpose of the doctrine of apparent authority
is to determine when a principal is liable for the actions of a person it has hired to do something,
when the principal has given a third party reason to believe that person is acting as the agent of the
principal. The doctrine has nothing to do with shielding an apparent agent from liability; it has
only to do with holding the principal liable for making others believe the apparent agent (who is
not a real agent) is acting on behalf of the principal. It is a legal means of protecting plaintiffs
from being deceived by persons who are made to believe they are dealing with the principal. It is
not an escape hatch for wrongdoing-defendants to absolve themselves for the consequences of
their torts.
Apparent authority differs from actual authority. It is created when the principal
voluntarily places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with the business usages and the nature of a particular business, is
justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority. Apparent
authority cannot be created by the acts and statements of the agent alone.

Am. W Enters. v. CNH, LLC., 155 Idaho 746 (2013)(emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Idaho recognizes that "apparent authority" is different from "actual
authority." There is a difference between a real agent and one acting with apparent authority,
and again, this has to do with actions of the principal which bind it to representations made by
anyone when the principal made a third party believe that person speaking was speaking on
behalf of the principal. "The declarations of an alleged agent made outside the presence of the
alleged principal are, of themselves, incompetent to prove agency." Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho
10, 12,501 P.2d 278,280 (1972), citing Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho 466, (1922). Apparent
authority of an agent is determined by acts of the principal not acts of the agent. It is conduct of
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principal and not of agent that binds the principal. Declarations of an agent are insufficient to
prove the grant of power exercised by him and bind his principal to their parties. Chamberlain v.
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 42 Idaho 604,247 P. 12.
There are no cases allowing "apparent authority" to be used as a shield of liability for
persons in the position of Stephanie Kaufman, because that is not what apparent authority is for.
All of the subheadings in the Restatement of Agency, 3rd, concerning apparent authority discuss
when the principal can be held liable. There is not one which allows a defense for the person
claiming to be the agent. See, e.g., RS 3d Agency Sections 2.05, 2.06, 2.07 (Restitution to the 3rd
party who relies), 3. 02 (estops the principal from escaping restitution to the person made to believe
the agent had authority to bind the principal).
The defendant erroneously asserted the doctrine of apparent authority as a shield to escape
liability, when no such defense exists in law---anywhere in the nation.
In addition to there being evidence that the Defendant was an independent contractor,
Defense counsel erroneously asserted, and the Court erroneously found, that the theory of
"apparent authority" could be used as a shield to protect independent contractors from the
consequences of their misconduct. The District Court's finding otherwise is a mistake of law,
which must be reversed. On remand, the jury should not even be allowed to consider whether
the defendant could be considered an agent of Anytime Fitness on the basis of "apparent
authority."
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III. The Court Erred by making a finding that an Agency Relationship existed when it had
no power to do so.
"This Court has previously viewed the question of whether an agency relationship
exists as a question of fact for the jury to determine." Id. at 735 n.2, 366 P .3d at
1095 n.2. But, to be clear, "[w]hether facts sufficient to constitute an agency
relationship exist is indeed a question of fact for the jury, however, whether a given
set of facts are sufficient to constitute an agency relationship is a question of law
appropriate for this Court's consideration." Id.

Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 162 Idaho 317, 330, 396 P.3d 1199,
2033-2034 (Idaho 2017) citing Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095
(2016).
The Court in Forbush lays out a two-part analysis. The first step of this analysis is for the
Court to determine if the facts before it are sufficient that an agency relationship could exist. The
second step is for a jury to decide, based on those facts, if an agency relationship exists.
The lower Court misinterpreted this analysis to mean that the Court could make a
determination and finding as to whether or not an agency relationship existed, as a matter of law.
Clearly, that determination, which is the second step in the analysis, can be made only by a jury
as it is a determination of fact and not one of law.

In its Bench Memorandum Re:[sic]

Kaufman's[sic] Motion to Reconsider, the Court quoted Forbush as cited above, but emphasized
the section reading "whether a given set of facts are sufficient to constitute an agency relationship
is a question of law appropriate for this Court's consideration," which, ironically, is exactly the
portion of the analysis the lower Court erroneously skipped by making a finding that an agency
relationship existed. (R., p. 139, L. 12-14).
The determination of whether an agency relationship exists is a question for the jury to
determine. At the summary judgment stage, even if there is sufficient evidence for the Court to
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find that an agency relationship could exist, it cannot make the jury's determination that the agency
relationship does in fact exist and the agency question fails as a matter of law. That is the law in
Idaho.
The Court skipped over the first step in the analysis and invaded the purview of the jury
by making a finding that agency existed. The Court did not have the power to do so, and on
these grounds alone, the District Court's decision granting summary judgment must be reversed.

IV. The Court Erred by construing facts in the light most favorable to the moving party.

The Idaho Supreme Court stated in Friel v. Boise City Housing Authority that "[t]he Court
liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,
485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994).
The principal, not the one asserting agency, determines whether an agency relationship
exists. Defendant produced no evidence that the principal agreed she was an agent of Anytime
Fitness. Plaintiff produced an affidavit from one representing Anytime Fitness in its earlier filings
in support of its summary judgment motion expressly stating, under oath, that Stefani Kaufman
was an independent contractor, not an agent of Anytime Fitness.
Since Stefani Kaufman had no power to make herself an agent of Anytime Fitness, the
affidavit on behalf of Anytime Fitness carries far more weight on this topic. Aside from the fact
that the affidavit produced by Plaintiff supporting her contention that Defendant was an
independent contractor defeats, as a matter of law, summary judgment brought by the defendant,
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Plaintiffs evidence was far more compelling than Defendant's self-serving affidavit with no
support from the principal.

V.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the District Court has made clear errors resulting in the erroneous dismissal

of Plaintiffs case by summary judgment. The Court's first error was that it applied the doctrine
of apparent authority as a defense to liability of the defendant in this case. Apparent authority is a
mechanism in which (1) a principal is able to be held liable for the actions of one who the (2)
principal has placed in a position in which (3) a person of ordinary prudence who is conversant in
the business usages and the nature of a particular business, (4) would be justified in believing that
the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority. It is not a defense to liability.
The second error occurred when the District Court used the doctrine of apparent authority
to declare that Stefani Kaufman was indemnified by the agreement between Anytime Fitness or
AT Fitness, LLC., and Amey J. Nelson. The agreement's indemnities extend to agents and
employees, but do not extend to independent contractors. The Court, improperly applying the
doctrine of apparent authority, made a finding that the indemnities of the agreement between AT
Fitness and Amey J. Nelson applied to Stefani Kaufman and barred her claim. This finding was
clearly erroneous because apparent authority does not function to shield a defendant from liability,
but to extend liability to the principal of the agent and could not be used to justify indemnifying
Stefani Kaufman's actions.
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The third error made by the District Court was one oflaw. The District Court misread and
failed to apply the test from the controlling cases on this subject, namely Forbush and Humphries.
(supra). The Court made a finding that an agency relationship existed between AT Fitness LLC.,

or Anytime Fitness and Stefani Kaufman. The Court, as a matter of law, lacked the authority to
make that finding. The Court further committed an error when it failed to make a finding, which
was in its power to make, as to whether or not enough evidence existed for a jury to make a finding
that an agency relationship existed.
The fourth error that the District Court made was in construing the facts in the light most
favorable to the moving party. As a matter oflaw, the Court must construe the facts in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. In making its erroneous findings, the Court disregarded the
evidence presented to it through affidavit and record, and instead adopted the facts that Defendant
asserted as argument with no evidence, testimony, or affidavit to allow it to be admitted into the
Court.
Because of these errors by the District Court, this case must be reversed and remanded to
the District Court for trial, with no consideration given to apparent authority.

DATED this 29th day of November, 2018.
BROWNING LAW
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I hereby certify that on the 29 th day of November, 2018, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following attorney of record by email, efile, or facsimile.
Jeffrey A Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
ELAM & BURKE, PA
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DATED this 29 th day of November 2018.

Legal Assistant
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